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International Narcotics Biweekly Review

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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

4 January 1978

CONTENTS




25X6

25X1

ECUADOR: Narcotics-Related Corruption 3

NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS:

1. Turkey. 5




25X6

3. Colombia. 13

4. Netherlands. 15

BRIEFS 22

INTERESTING READING. 25

This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles or to 

25X1

SECRET

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

25X1

ECUADOR: Narcotics-Related Corruption

Although Ecuador plays a prominent interim transshipment role in the chain of cocaine trafficking countries in South America, it is not a major coca producer such as Peru or Bolivia, nor is it a primary cocaine "exporter" like Colombia. Nevertheless, US concern over Ecuador's potential to fill any vacuum left by a reduction of activity in the producer or exporter countries has prompted US officials in Quito to continue bilateral drug control talks with members of the military junta's Supreme Council. Foremost in these discussions is the subject of narcotics-related corruption.

25X1

Last month, the US Ambassador in Quito told Supreme Council member General Duran of President Carter's determination to make international cooperation on combating narcotics a high level priority in relations between Quito and Washington. General Duran, who is aware of the extent of narcotics corruption in his country, stated that he would "diagnose" the problem and implied that some action would be forthcoming.

Although some US officials have expressed guarded optimism that Duran will make an effort to do something about corruption, he may have neither the time nor the interest to address the problem seriously. Duran presently is enmeshed in political intrigues.

25X1

If Duran were to succeed in gaining power, he probably would ignore the military's promise to reinstate

4 January 1978

SECRET

SECRET

a constitutional government in Ecuador. It is uncertain whether or not Duran, as Chief of State, would take a more active role in narcotics control. His rumored shady business dealings and his close relationship with the venal Commanding General of Police and other corrupt enforcement officials suggests that Duran might take a permissive attitude toward narcotics corruption.

25X1

4 January 1978

4

SECRET

SECRET

NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

(Editor's Note: These items, produced for another CIA publication, do not deal specifically with the international narcotics situation. They are included here, however, because they concern developing political and economic situations that could impact on the international narcotics control effort.)

25X1

TURKEY: Coalition Government

President Koruturk on Sunday named opposition leader Bulent Ecevit to form a new coalition government. Prime Minister Demirel, who resigned Saturday when his coalition failed to win a vote of confidence, will remain as caretaker until Ecevit wins acceptance for his cabinet and program, possibly within two weeks.

Ecevit's efforts to bring down Demirel and his three-party coalition succeeded Saturday when he mustered 228 votes against the government in a no-confidence motion. Weakened by the defection of 11 Justice Party deputies last October, Demirel's government polled only 218 ballots, eight short of a majority.

An informal coalition headed by Ecevit and his Republican People's Party might be able to count upon 227 votes, one more than a majority. Aside from two small splinter parties possessing three votes and his own party's 213, Ecevit has received support from 11 of parliament's 14 independents.

While questions remain about Ecevit's ability to hold his prospective allies together, his success in unseating Demirel will probably strengthen the commitment to forming a stable government. Furthermore, Ecevit's

4 January 1978

SECRET

SECRET

allies might fear that a failure to put together a government could precipitate a political crisis in which the military might intervene--despite the recent statement by the chief of the General Staff that the military intends to stay out of politics.

Ecevit's highly personal approach to politics makes it difficult to predict his actions on foreign and domestic issues. He believes austerity measures are essential if Turkey's serious economic problems are to be solved and will probably accept the International Monetary Fund's conditions for granting a loan in order to reassure other international lenders.

Domestic security may prove a more difficult problem for Ecevit to solve. Turks have become accustomed to a high level of political violence, much of which is the work of individuals or small groups acting spontaneously and with little allegiance either to larger organizations or to ideologies. Ecevit, usually cast as a social democrat, might placate leftist elements but incite rightists to more violence.

In order to solve Turkey's continuing problems with Cyprus and the Aegean, Ecevit might opt for a dramatic move, such as an immediate meeting with Greece's Prime Minister Karamanlis. On Cyprus, Ecevit would probably be in a better position to make concessions than his predecessor.

Nevertheless, the Cyprus situation could well prove less open to compromise than are Turkish claims in the Aegean. The military might quietly press Ecevit to make progress on Cyprus in order to improve chances for US ratification of the \$1 billion Defense Cooperation Agreement, but they too are divided on how much Turkey should concede.

25X1

4 January 1978

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Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

25X6

COLOMBIA: Military Pressures Lopez To Control Crime Wave

Colombia's military leaders, concerned over the increasing number of kidnappings and other crimes in the country, presented President Lopez with a declaration

4 January 1978

SECRET

SECRET

late last month calling for the government to take immediate action to guarantee the rights of citizens. For a time, the controversial and unprecedented declaration threatened to sever completely the tenuous relations between Lopez and the military. Tensions have now eased, however, and the government has recently established new, albeit probably ineffective, measures to be taken against kidnapers and other criminal elements.

The declaration, which was signed by 33 top-ranking generals and admirals, implied that if the government proved unwilling or incapable of preserving peace, the armed forces would. The forceful action by the military was the result of several developments. Sixty people were kidnaped during 1977; a total of seven persons were taken in Bogota over one weekend during December. Military leaders were chagrined over accusations in the press about the armed forces' inability to stem the rising tide of violence and crime in the country. In addition, businessmen--who have been the primary targets of the ransom-motivated kidnappings--and other concerned civilian groups have been pressuring the armed forces to restore order. Finally, military leaders have been upset over the recent forced retirements of several senior officers and distressed by public criticism of Defense Minister Varon Valencia and Armed Forces Commander General Camacho for their roles in the presidentially ordered dismissals.

Lopez believes the military has not done enough on its own to deal with the rising crime problems. Although he could have reacted impulsively and negatively to the military's declaration, Lopez wisely chose to conciliate by mapping out emergency measures to cope with the problem.

In his end of the year message, the President praised the military and simultaneously outlined the new security program. According to the new decree, the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) will be responsible for the "investigation and prevention" of kidnapping, while the Judicial Police (JP) will concentrate exclusively on narcotics trafficking. Furthermore, the DAS, JP, National Police (F-2), and other state intelligence services will form a unified command under the coordination of the Attorney General.

4 January 1978

SECRET

SECRET

The consolidation will undoubtedly result in more administrative efficiency and may, in fact, produce some tangible results in the operational sphere--particularly intelligence on kidnappings planned by the various insurgent groups. The government's plan, however, appears to be more of a political gesture and less of a practical solution to the problem. In actual practice it may prove impossible to protect likely targets from extortion or ransom by common criminal gangs. Two more kidnappings have already occurred since the new measures went into effect, and much of the citizenry remains skeptical that a solution can be found quickly, if at all.

Efforts to enlist the population's support--a factor on which much of the assumed eventual success of the campaign apparently is based--may be the weakest link in the security chain. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the insurgent group presently holding a US Peace Corps member hostage, has already taken reprisals against several campesinos who were enlisted by local authorities to report on the FARC's plans. The murder of the campesinos will dissuade many from cooperating with security forces in the rural areas.

The situation is a little different in the urban centers where the most recent spate of kidnappings has occurred. Although townspeople would probably be more inclined to cooperate with authorities, the sheer number of prominent businessmen and other "lucrative" targets would make it impossible for everyone to be protected. Unless the plan develops into something more effective and stringent, the rewards of easy ransom money will more than likely continue to outweigh the kidnapers' fear of capture. Should his plan fail to produce quick results, Lopez will find himself again at serious odds with the military.

25X1

NETHERLANDS: A Rough Time Ahead

Along with the Scandinavians, the Swiss, and the West Germans, the Dutch have come to enjoy the highest

4 January 1978

SECRET

SECRET

standard of living in Europe. The Netherlands, in terms of its protracted domestic tranquility, is also one of a select few nations. Today, however, the crowded, civilized prosperous Dutch are uncomfortably aware of how tenuous their well-being has become.

Racial Homogeneity to Social Diversity

The dissolution of empire and the steady expansion of the Dutch economy in the 1950s and 1960s transformed a racially homogeneous society into a multiracial one. A land in which over 99 percent of the residents were of northwest European origin successfully absorbed in three decades some 500,000 foreigners, who with their progeny are now estimated to compose about 6 percent of the Netherlands' population. About 200,000 were Eurasians from the former Netherlands East Indies; perhaps as many as another 100,000 were East Indian loyalists who preferred Holland to the new Indonesian Government; and 35,000 formed the South Moluccan community. Except for about 25,000 of the South Moluccans, all of the East Indians were integrated into Dutch society with minimal disruption.

Integration was facilitated by the unique structure of Dutch society. Clearly defined institutional and philosophical groupings, called locally *zuilen* (columns), provided a congenial, supportive environment for each social, political, economic, and religious persuasion and made the question of race superfluous. Thus was reaffirmed Holland's tolerance of those whose appearance or behavior deviated from the norm.

But the Moluccan terrorist acts of the past three years, notably the hijacking of a train and a school in May 1977, are threatening this traditional outlook. The bloody denouncement of the most recent action has stimulated resentment against the South Moluccans, and, by extension, to other dark-skinned residents. The Moluccans' goal of persuading the Dutch to somehow liberate their home islands from Indonesian control and to repatriate them is clearly unattainable. Dutch commitments to the Moluccans made in the late 1940s, when both were fighting the Indonesian takeover, cannot be realized in the much changed world of the 1970s. Until this goal is relinquished, however, approximately 25,000 Moluccans will

4 January 1978

SECRET

maintain their self-imposed ghetto existence, which is increasingly resented by the Dutch. Further terrorist acts by a few extremists from among this group may yet shatter the longstanding ethnic tolerance of the Dutch.

The other residents of non-Dutch origin include dark-skinned migrants from Surinam and the Antilles and about 100,000 south Europeans and Turks who migrated to Holland during the Netherlands' rapid industrial expansion. These migrants have become accustomed to the much higher Dutch standard of living and are loath to go home even though the Dutch job market is weakening. Thus far, the native Dutch--the unions, employers, and the government--have seemed equally reluctant to oblige them to depart. But with the economic recovery forecast to be sluggish at best, the competition for jobs must ultimately put this tolerant attitude to a severe test. Unemployment is now hovering at 5 to 6 percent nationally, with some depressed sections averaging as high as 12 percent.

Labor Relations: Cooperation to Confrontation?

Until this year, the penchant for accommodation that so characterized the Dutch extended to labor relations. The Dutch may still boast the lowest percentage of hours lost by strikes in Western Europe. If a society almost equally divided between Protestants and Catholics, with a large contingent of non-believers and featuring as many as 11 political parties winning seats in the last elections, could govern itself effectively, could not organized labor and management similarly adjust their differences?

Traditionally the "cooperation model" in Holland's labor relations, as that in *Modell Deutschland*, was a paradigm that other countries sought to emulate. But in both countries the "cooperation model" is giving way to a "confrontation model," as the respective pies to be shared have ceased to expand. The mechanism whereby employers, unions, and government attempt to reconcile their requirements is breaking down. Unions in Holland, encouraged by the behavior of the large, radical Metalworkers' Union, are withdrawing from the tripartite consultations over such issues as their inability to gain more say on questions of industrial investment or divestment and the strengthening of the "works councils" so

4 January 1978

SECRET

SECRET

as to enhance the workers' role in codetermination. The employers, understandably, are resisting on matters involving their ultimate independence--their ability to make decisions affecting their future. Also at issue in a shaky economy are wage indexation, income leveling--controversial even within the labor movement--a "profits equals more jobs" formula to be imposed on employers, the introduction of a corporate excess profits tax, and an expansion of the state into such private preserves as banking. The Netherlands suffered a dent in its strike-free reputation last February, when workers in several industries stayed away from their jobs for almost a month. They sought and got, with governmental intervention, wage indexation for 1977. Unless progress is made soon in resolving several of the contentious issues clouding labor relations, a more serious sequence of strikes may occur early in 1978.

Political Expression

The recent 26-week effort of the Dutch to form a government is a reflection of the malaise afflicting the nation. Notwithstanding the essential endorsement by the electorate in May of a center-left government such as had governed the nation for the previous four years, the two principal components of that coalition, the Socialist and major elements of the Christian Democrats, were unable to again form a cabinet. The decision of the Labor Party, now the largest political grouping in the country, to go into opposition, while the Christian Democrats form a minority government with the Liberals, seems to forebode an end to the long period of governmental stability.

Controversial noneconomic issues facing the government concern abortion, outlays for defense, and nuclear power. Efforts to resolve the many conflicts will inevitably widen the fissures separating the Labor Party from the center and the right.

Economic Dimension

On balance, the health of the Dutch body politic will rest on its future economic viability. As in other advanced industrial nations, labor intensive industries are the hardest hit by soaring wage and social

4 January 1978

SECRET

welfare costs. Employers with declining profits are reluctant to heed the government's pleas to expand investment. When they do invest, they are more interested in introducing labor-saving equipment than in increasing their work force with ever more expensive and hard-to-discharge labor. Escalating wage costs, aggravated by the persistent strength of the guilder, have squeezed Dutch manufacturers to where they are ceasing to be competitive on the world market. It has been the Netherlands' abundant natural gas, whether exported or used domestically, that has propped up the guilder.

Cheap energy--the vast natural gas deposits under Holland--that provided the boost to the economic growth of the late 1960s and early 1970s is beginning to run out. A measure of the importance of natural gas to the Dutch economy is the vast revenue accruing to the government from domestic and foreign sales of this source of energy. The government's share of net earnings soared from \$166 million in 1970 to \$3.6 billion in 1977. Much of the cost of today's "super-welfare state" is financed by these revenues. The gas bonanza is coming to an end at a time when the cost of substitute petroleum is likely to be soaring, increasing the danger of serious balance of payments problems. The weakening of the guilder, however, should provide some aid for nongas exports.

Hard hit because of reduced demand, high labor costs, and the strong guilder are the large shipbuilding, steel, and textile and clothing industries. The shipyards are planning a 30 percent reduction in capacity, entailing a 30 percent reduction in the industry's labor force. Textiles and clothing will suffer more, the former having experienced a 40 percent reduction in the labor force since 1970, and the clothing sector a 58 percent drop over the same period. Although in a deep depression, steel has recently cut its labor force by a relatively modest 10 percent. It anticipates, however, at least another 10 percent cut in the next two years before returning to profitability in 1980.

All three industries, plus the much smaller domestic automobile industry, are experiencing increasingly stiff challenges from outside the Common Market--notably the Far East. The competitiveness of the West European steel industry in relation to that of Japan has deteriorated markedly. With Belgian and Dutch steel industry wages

4 January 1978

SECRET

the highest in Europe, rationalization is mandatory. In a country that is more dependent on exports than almost any other in the industrialized world--over 40 percent of its national income is so derived--restrictions on international trade are not lightly undertaken. In 1977 the Netherlands' balance of trade moved from surplus to deficit, while forecasts for a current account surplus have been reduced markedly to \$840 million.

Respected Dutch economists doubt whether the country would be able to exploit adequately a new upturn in world trade unless there is progress in reducing wage and social security costs and, to a lesser extent, the strong position of the guilder that together are crippling Dutch competitiveness. There is a tentative consensus that recovery and growth may depend substantially on zero growth in real wages in 1978. The unions have in principle accepted no growth as a Spartan necessity--to achieved by a wage increase that will match the inflation rate plus an extra 1.5 percent from government measures. The government contribution would compensate for anticipated increases in rents, gas prices, and national insurance premiums and would derive from tax and social security rebates.

Dutch experience in construction and banking pre-date the founding of the modern state. Reclamation of arable land from the North Sea through the construction of elaborate dikes and canals was well under way by the 16th century. The Dutch consider only mildly excessive their claim that "God made the rest of the world, but we made Holland." Banking skills transplanted from the north Italian city states to Bruges during the Middle Ages moved quickly to Antwerp and Amsterdam, which for a while became the principal financial centers of the north. This role was taken over by Amsterdam exclusively following Dutch victory in the 17th century wars of independence. The Dutch soon came to be alluded to as the "bankers of Europe." With but a few interruptions, they have continued to fill this role to the present day.

Thriving commercial agriculture accounts for roughly one quarter of Dutch exports. It continues to be helped by a sophisticated division of labor, helpful EC agricultural trading mechanisms, and the favorable geographic location of the Netherlands.

4 January 1978

SECRET

Conclusion

In sum, mounting tensions in the traditionally stable Dutch society spring from the changing social and economic environment. Sporadic terrorist acts and the threat of more are awakening ethnic antipathies long subdued, if not unknown among the Dutch. The most intractable challenge, however, is the economic one. Not only is public tranquillity in the crowded country largely contingent on steady growth, but to a nation that must "export or die," world economic conditions are a formidable, largely uncontrollable factor. With the anticipated exhaustion of its large natural gas deposits, the specter of rising petroleum prices is now nearly as real for Holland as for most of its neighbors. The very well paid and cared for Dutch will have to tighten their belts to overcome increasingly stiff foreign competition, in sluggish world markets. The prognosis for the Netherlands, as for the EC as a whole, is for a rough time ahead, with a concomitant unsettling of social and political life.

25X1

4 January 1978

SECRET

SECRET

BRIEFS

TURKEY: The latest estimate of Turkey's opium poppy straw production for the 1976-77 crop year is 35,500 metric tons with a possibility that the final total could reach 36,000 tons. Although the harvest has been completed, Ankara has not yet released its official statistics. In any event, the harvest has been much less than the 50,000 to 60,000 tons predicted last spring. The Embassy in Ankara notes that the yield was much lower than anticipated because of the higher-than-usual incidence of disease, which resulted primarily from the unusual heat and perhaps the lack of crop rotation in the growing area.

Some opium poppy growers have been critical of the government's failure to raise the authorized poppy straw purchase price, which has not kept up with inflationary pressures. American observers in Ankara do not anticipate, however, that growers will be discouraged to the point of reducing production because they also profit from nonnarcotic by-products such as poppy seed and oil.

Work is continuing on the poppy straw processing plant in southern Turkey, and experimental processing of the alkaloid reportedly will begin in the summer of 1979. German technicians are expected to arrive this month, and completion of the plant is now projected for the end of February 1979.

25X1

NEPAL: The Prime Minister of Nepal assured Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dubs, during his recent courtesy call on the Prime Minister, that the government of Nepal has banned all trafficking in narcotics and that his government has every intention of enforcing the ban. The Prime Minister was described as speaking with conviction. There were reports last summer that Nepal planned to begin state-controlled production of opium derivatives and that the USSR and Yugoslavia were interested in purchasing opiates from Nepal. In October, a

4 January 1978

SECRET

SECRET

pro-Soviet newspaper in Katmandu published an editorial criticizing the ban on opium cultivation and the production of opiates in Nepal claiming that the ban deprived Nepal of a major source of foreign exchange. In late October, Foreign Minister Aryal admitted there had been some talk of going into opium poppy cultivation but the subject apparently had been dropped. The Prime Minister's assurances have reaffirmed his earlier statement to US officials that the Government of Nepal has no current intention to produce opium. [REDACTED]

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THAILAND: Drug addiction has rapidly become "a very serious problem" for all Thai military services, especially among new recruits, according to a high level Thai military officer. He estimates the annual increase in drug addiction to be about 5 percent. The US officer who submitted the report noted that drug abuse is also becoming a serious problem within the civilian sector; a recent National Economic and Social Development Board report claimed that there are currently about 600,000 drug addicts and users in Thailand. [REDACTED]

25X1

THAILAND: According to the local press, Thai Customs officers recently seized over a ton of raw opium and at least 30 kilograms of morphine on an island off the southwestern coast of Thailand. The alleged seizure took place in a remote area and remains unconfirmed. [REDACTED]

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4 January 1978

SECRET

SECRET



25X1

PERU: According to local press reports, the Peruvian Investigative Police (PIP) have seized three illicit cocaine-paste laboratories, one of which was located only a few blocks from the US Embassy in Lima. The 17 suspects arrested included both Peruvians and Argentinians; at least one was described as an important trafficker. The Embassy report covering the press story cites the arrests as evidence of the increased antinarcotics activity of the Peruvian security forces during recent months.

25X1

4 January 1978

SECRET

SECRET

INTERESTING READING

Plea to Rethink Drug Treatment Program (NEW ZEALAND)--
TNDD,* No. L/7523, 19 December 1977, pp. 9-11. "A plea for the government to overhaul its program of treatment of the growing number of drug addicts was made (recently) by a drug clinic case worker...who said that not only had the government's methadone programme failed but the police's attitude in dealing with the drug problem was wrong and unhelpful."

Cooperation with New Zealand Police Cited (THAILAND)--
TNDD, No. L/7523, pp. 27-28. "Thailand is doing its best to prevent drugs leaving the country, but so long as there is demand and users are prepared to pay big money, people will find a way of getting it out," according to the Chief of the Thai Police Narcotics Suppression Center and deputy secretary of the Narcotics Control Board. "A lot of drugs were leaving Thailand by sea, but...the trend is now to send more by air."

*Increased Addiction Attributed to 'Dumping' Drugs (BRAZIL)--*TNDD, No. L/7523, pp. 33-43. "The first alert was sounded in mid-1976. Marijuana had disappeared from the market. Some psychiatrists... were afraid that a crisis was imminent on the heretofore stable drug market.... In other words, the cocaine invasion was beginning, and the 'dumping' prices were used for the market's reserves."

*New Restrictions on Drugs Even for Medicinal Use (BRAZIL)--*TNDD, No. L/7523, pp. 51-53. "...a ban (has been) imposed throughout the country on the manufacture, importing, exporting, reexporting, and marketing of LSD and 12 other tranquilizing substances which cause physical or psychological dependence...even for medicinal use."

**US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Translations on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Va. 22201.*

25X1

4 January 1978

SECRET

SECRET

Drugs Prosecutor Sees 1977 as Record Year For Violations (FINLAND)--TNDD, No. L/7523. "1977 was close to the record year of 1975 in narcotics violations The largest group of users are between 18 and 20 years of age. Younger users are under . . . age 10."

Rise in Crime Statistics Tied to Drug Abuse (GREECE)--TNDD, No. L/7523, pp. 89-90.

Trafficker Arrested with a Kilo and a Half of Pure Heroin (ITALY)--TNDD, No. 7523, p. 91. "In view of the discovery and the dimensions of narcotics traffic, it is believed that the two couriers might be part of an international organization of drug traffickers."

Acupuncture Proves Promising (HONG KONG)--TNDD, No. L/7533, 27 December 1977, p. 11. " indications are that the treatment of drug addiction by acupuncture and electro-stimulation on an out-patient basis is very promising and cost-effective"

Text of Brazilian-Venezuelan Agreement to Suppress Trafficking (BRAZIL)--TNDD, No. L/7533, pp. 47-49. "The campaign against illegal drug traffic is the objective of one of the agreements signed (recently) by the Governments of Brazil and Venezuela." The text explains that "drugs will be understood to be the substances listed and described in the 1961 single Convention on Narcotics and the 1971 Psychotropic Substances Convention"

Rival Cocaine-Trafficking Gangs Clash on Moto Grosso Border (BRAZIL)--TNDD, No. L/7533, pp. 50-55. "The arrest in October of Joao Tolentino Pereira, the biggest cocaine trafficker on the Brazil-Bolivia border, stirred up a violent clash. . . the police had hoped to use him to break up an international drug network which involved more than 250 people and operated 40 laboratories for processing cocaine."

Drug 'Mafias' Control Santa Marta (Magdalena) (COLOMBIA)--TNDD, L/7533, pp. 60-70. According to an article by Rene Perez in *EL TIEMPO*, the Mafia has penetrated all sectors. The measures that the government, the police, and the DAS (Administrative Department of Security) have taken to moralize local institutions have been futile. There is always some agent or high official implicated.

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